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Abstract  
In this study, I investigate differences in decision-making outcomes for groups under 
different hierarchies using an experimental approach. Many decisions in firms, 
households, and other contexts are not taken by individuals, but by groups. In addition, 
most groups, especially in firms, are characterized by hierarchical organization 
structures. While research in management, sociology and psychology has been 
investigating the role of hierarchies for a long time, there is a lack of experimental 
economic research on the effect of various group structures or hierarchies on decision-
making and its quality. I compare the choices of groups in Holt and Laury (2002) type 
lottery choices and in intellective tasks in five different group types: a group without 
hierarchy, a hierarchy by age (where the oldest group member decides), by merit 
(where the winner in a financial literacy quiz decides), by chance (where a randomly 
determined leader decides) and by election (where an elected leader decides). 
Experimental results suggest that there are no differences in the number of safe choices 
between the different hierarchy types. However, groups with a leader assigned on the 
basis of merit perform better in intellective tasks.  
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Hierarchies and decision-making in groups: Experimental evidence 
 
1. Motivation 
Individual decision-making is a key research area in microeconomics and a considerable 
amount of theoretical and experimental research has been devoted to its analysis. 
However, many decisions in firms, households, and other contexts are taken by groups, 
not by individuals. In addition, most groups, especially in firms, are characterized by 
hierarchical organization structures. While hierarchies are a common feature of 
organizations, surprisingly little is known about their effect on outcomes in economic 
experiments.  
In this study, I analyze the effects of hierarchy on outcomes in a lottery choice task (Holt 
and Laury 2002) and in intellective tasks (following the group task continuum proposed 
by Laughlin 1980), compared to the choices of a majority voting group of three. Magee 
and Galinsky (2008) posit that status and power are the two bases of hierarchy and 
describe power as related to ‘control over valued resources’ and status as ‘respect one has 
in the eyes of others’. In order to explain the pervasiveness of hierarchy in social settings, 
they outline two functions of hierarchy, namely, establishing order and improving 
decision-making (related to power) and motivating individuals (related to status). In this 
study, hierarchy is conceptualized as formal authority (power) over a group of three’s 
decision-making in the abovementioned two tasks, i.e. the group leader decides about the 
group’s choices after a group discussion period. The hierarchy is implemented according 
to four different mechanisms: a hierarchy by vote, by age, by merit and by a random 
mechanism. 
Results suggest that compared to majority voting groups, groups with a leader assigned on 
the basis of merit are more likely to give correct answers in intellective tasks. No effects 
are found for the other types of hierarchy investigated in this study, and no differences are 
found between voting groups and hierarchy groups with respect to the number of safe 
choices they make in the lottery choice task. 
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The remainder of this study is organized as follows: In section 2, I briefly discuss related 
literature in experimental economics, psychology, and management. In section 3, I 
describe experimental procedures and in section 4, I discuss the results. In section 5, I 
present the conclusion and an outlook. 
2. Literature Review 
Experimental economic research has in recent years increasingly focused on group 
decision-making, while research in management, sociology, and psychology has been 
investigating group decision-making and the role of hierarchies for a long time using 
different research methods and analyzing different tasks (see, for example, Granovetter 
2005 for an overview of results in sociology). Research results in management typically 
show mixed effects of hierarchies on outcomes, with some studies suggesting that 
hierarchies might improve performance because they reduce conflict and promote 
coordination and other studies suggesting they might reduce performance because 
hierarchies decrease group members’ motivation and stifle innovation (see Bunderson et 
al. 2016 and the literature cited there).  
On a related topic, the effect of different decision rules, such as unanimity or majority 
voting, has been studied in the political economy literature (Feddersen and Pesendorfer 
1998, Messner and Polborn 2004) as well as in psychology (Kerr and Tindale 2004, 
Tindale and Winget 2019). Nonetheless, these strands of related literature do not analyze 
tasks such as lottery choice and do not analyze the possible effect of hierarchies on 
decision-making outcomes using an (economic) experimental approach. Therefore, this 
study aims to investigate possible differences in decision-making outcomes for groups 
with different types of hierarchies using an experimental approach, allowing to isolate 
ceteris paribus effects (Falk and Heckman 2009). 
Previous experimental economic research on group decision-making has analyzed group 
behavior in both games (i.e. decision-making tasks against another player) and in non-
strategic situations (i.e. games against nature). As the goal of this study is to focus on the 
latter, I will only review the literature that analyzes tasks similar to the ones in this study. 
For a more complete overview, see Kugler et al. (2012). 
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The finding that “biases” exist in individual decision-making in experiments led 
researchers to investigate whether these biases persist in groups. There is no clear-cut 
answer to this research question: in some settings, groups show stronger biases than 
individuals, while in other settings, the biases become weaker (Kerr et al. 1996). 
Similarly, research in psychology also suggests that groups’ decisions are not necessarily 
superior to those of individuals (Tindale and Winget 2019).1  These differences in 
outcomes might be because mechanisms used for reaching an agreement about a group’s 
choice differ widely. With the exception of Baillon et al. (2013) who compare the 
majority rule and unanimity rule for decision-making, none of the previous research in 
economics pays attention to the possible effects of different types of hierarchy or 
decision-making rules on decision-making outcomes. Baillon et al. (2013) analyze group 
behavior in lottery choices and find that whereas groups are less likely to violate 
stochastic dominance, they make riskier choices than individuals in Allais paradox tasks 
(Allais 1953). With respect to decision-making rules, the unanimity rule is found to 
improve both group communication and group rationality. Baker et al. (2008) also 
compare individual and three-person group behavior in lottery tasks and with the 
unanimity rule and find that the number of safe lotteries chosen by groups is higher than 
the number of safe lotteries chosen by individual group members. Masclet et al. (2009) 
compare individual and three-person group behavior with the majority rule and find that 
groups chose safer lotteries. Rockenbach et al. (2007) find that groups accumulate more 
expected value at a lower risk than individuals, although both violate expected utility 
theory. However, Shupp and Williams (2008) find that whereas groups are less risk averse 
than individuals over lottery choices with high winning probabilities, they become more 
risk averse as the winning probability decreases.  
Bone et al. (1999) and Bateman and Munro (2005) both analyze if individuals and groups 
differ with respect to violations of expected utility theory. Bateman and Munro (2005) 
compare couples to individuals and find no differences in behavior. Bone et al. (1999) 
 
1 However, Charness and Sutter (2012) analyze results from game theoretical experiments 
where groups are the players and conclude that groups are more likely to make choices 
that are predicted by game theory. 
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compare randomly-matched groups of two individuals and find no differences either. 
Charness et al. (2007) analyse if groups and individuals differ in violation of 
monotonicity with respect to first-order stochastic dominance. This violation can actually 
be a decision-making error and not a mere expression of preferences; that is, an individual 
should always prefer a better chance of winning more money. For groups of two and three 
and no specified decision rule, they find that groups are less likely to make errors when 
facing these lottery choices. Deck et al. (2012) analyze differences between individuals 
and groups of two and find that gender and age influence bargaining strength, and that 
making a pair decision first increases risk-taking in subsequent individual choices. Ertac 
and Gurdal (2012) analyze risk-taking behavior on behalf of a group and find that men are 
more willing to become leaders than women, and that both take fewer risks when deciding 
on behalf of a group. Maciejovsky et al. (2013) find that groups make choices closer to 
the rational prediction and learn the solution faster than individuals in challenging 
probability and reasoning tasks, namely, the Monty Hall problem and the Wason selection 
task.  
To summarize the experimental literature on group decision-making, there is no 
consensus about whether groups make better decisions than individuals, or whether they 
are more rational than individuals. In addition, with the exception of Baillon et al. (2013), 
no previous research focuses on the possible role of different decision-making rules, 
especially hierarchies. Therefore, an investigation of choice over lotteries with different 
hierarchies and performance in intellective tasks presents a worthwhile avenue for 
research.  
The literature on organizational behavior and psychology has mostly focused on the 
impact hierarchies might have on performance. Following Laughlin (1980), there has 
been a broad distinction between performance in ‘intellective tasks’ that have a correct 
answer (e.g. algebra problems) and ‘judgmental tasks’ that do not. In this framework, the 
lottery choice task belongs to the second category, as there is no correct answer, in 
contrast to the intellective tasks. Levine and Smith (2013) distinguish between ‘group 
problem-solving tasks’ that have high demonstrability and are intellective and ‘group 
decision-making tasks’ that have low demonstrability and are judgmental. In social 
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psychology, much of the second type involves tasks where groups have to choose from 
among a small number of discrete alternatives (such as lotteries). This study uses tasks of 
both types and analyses the effect of hierarchies on their outcomes. 
According to Halevy et al. (2011), hierarchies are one of the most common forms of 
organization and often emerge spontaneously. They identify five ways in which 
hierarchies can enhance performance and success: They fulfil psychological needs, such 
as power and status; provide an incentive system, therefore motivating both high- and 
low-ranked individuals; increase coordination; reduce conflict; and improve cooperation. 
Finally, they also bring about complementary psychological processes. Halevy et al. 
(2011) also identify three moderators when hierarchy is beneficial for organisations: when 
there is procedural interdependence, when the hierarchy is legitimate, and when different 
bases of hierarchy such as competence or power are aligned rather than misaligned. 
Consequently, when status (i.e. leader’s status in a hierarchy) is conferred based on 
individual characteristics that are irrelevant or even detrimental to goals, hierarchies 
might not be beneficial (Halevy et al. 2011).  
Other authors have focused on why group inequalities such as hierarchy might worsen 
group performance. Ronay et al. (2012) focus on the role of status conflicts and their 
potential detrimental effect on group performance. They find that hierarchically-
differentiated groups are more productive in a high, rather than low, procedural 
interdependence task. 
There is almost no literature on hierarchy and its possible impact on risk-taking behavior. 
One exception is the work by Mihet (2013), who does not take an experimental approach 
but analyzes firm-level data from 51 countries for the effect of ‘culture’ on corporate risk-
taking behavior. This is measured using data from the Corporate Vulnerability Utility 
(CVU) developed by the IMF using Worldscope and Datastream data. The findings 
suggest (among other results) that risk-taking is higher in countries with low tolerance for 
hierarchical relationships. 
The previous section has shown that the effect of hierarchies depends on a number of 
factors, such as the type of task that groups are supposed to perform and the criteria upon 
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which leadership is conferred. Based on the surveyed literature, the following hypotheses 
are derived:  
H1: Groups where the leader has been assigned based on irrelevant characteristics (such 
as age or using a random assignment mechanism) perform worse on intellective tasks than 
those where the leader was assigned based on merit. 
H2: Groups with a hierarchy make more safe choices in a lottery choice task than those 
without hierarchy. 
3. Experimental Procedures  
In the following section, I will describe the experimental procedures in more detail. First, 
I will describe the experimental design and treatments needed for analyzing the research 
question. Secondly, I will describe the implementation of ‘hierarchy’ in experimental 
treatments. Thirdly, I will describe the decision-making tasks used during the 
experiments. Finally, I will describe the process of conducting the experiments. 
The experiments were conducted using a within-subjects design. To investigate the effect 
of hierarchy on decision-making outcomes, three treatments were required: an individual 
decision-making experiment as the baseline case to compare group and individual 
choices; a group decision-making experiment without hierarchy; and a group decision-
making experiment with hierarchy, where different types of hierarchies were investigated. 
The effect of hierarchy on group decision-making can then be observed by comparing the 
results between the second and the third treatment.  
The second experimental treatment (group without hierarchy) was implemented as group 
decision-making with majority vote as the decision-making mechanism. With majority 
vote, every group member’s decision has the same weight and there is no hierarchy. 
For the third experimental treatment (group with hierarchy), four different types of 
hierarchies were investigated. The first type of hierarchy was to have an elected leader for 
every group. The second type was a ‘hierarchy by merit’, where the group member who 
performed best on a test was the group leader. The third type was a ‘hierarchy by age’, 
where the oldest group member was the group leader. Finally, a ‘hierarchy by chance’ 
was also investigated, where the group leader was selected by a random mechanism. In all 
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hierarchies, the leader took the final decision after a ten-minute discussion time with 
group members.  
Similar decision-making tasks were used to enable comparison with previous research on 
group decision-making. The lottery described in Holt and Laury (2002) was selected 
because of its widespread use. The fact that this decision-making task has been used in a 
considerable number of previous studies enables both the replication of previous results 
and a comparison of the effects of different hierarchies. In addition to this lottery task 
choice, groups also had to solve intellective tasks, similar to those described in Curseu et 
al. (2013) and Huang and Wang (2010). Those tasks represented the application of 
framing effects, the Ellsberg paradox, and basic probability. Examples of all intellective 
tasks can be found in Appendix 2. 
Sessions were conducted as paper-and-pencil experiments due to the lack of an 
experimental lab at the university where the sessions took place. In line with standard 
practice in experimental economics, undergraduate students were subjects, with no 
restrictions based on major, age, or gender. As this was the first economic experiment 
conducted at the university, there were no restrictions on prior experiment participation 
either. The instructions were translated into Korean by one person and back into English 
by another person to check for inconsistencies. Non-Korean subjects were provided with 
the original English instructions, whereas Korean subjects were provided with translated 
instructions. The instructions were pre-tested and the overall time needed for completion 
of all tasks and questionnaires was determined. The experimental sessions were 
conducted in three sessions, with a total of 99 participants. After deleting observations 
with missing values, a total of 96 participants in 32 groups remained. As each group 
participated in five rounds (as a voting group and under all four types of hierarchy 
investigated in this study), the group dataset consists of n = 160 observations. A total of n 
= 128 participants were leaders in one or more types of hierarchies and, therefore, a 
dataset consisting of leaders is also available for analysis. 
Table 12 in the appendix provides basic demographics for the sample. 
During all three experimental sessions, subjects were first read the instructions. In 
sessions with both Korean and non-Korean subjects, the instructions were read aloud in 
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both English and Korean, and in Korean in sessions with Korean subjects only. Subjects 
then made an individual choice over the lottery and completed three intellective tasks. 
After individual tasks, subjects were randomly assigned into groups of three where they 
participated in all five group settings (i.e. the voting group and the four different hierarchy 
group settings). Participation order in the different types of hierarchies was randomized. 
After the final treatment, subjects answered a background questionnaire. 
Finally, payments were determined and subjects were paid according to their choices in 
all three treatments (individual, group without hierarchy, and group with hierarchy). For 
each of the lottery choices, one row was randomly determined by the throw of a ten-sided 
die to be relevant for the payout. Payment was determined identically, was the same 
amount for all members of the group in the group treatments and corresponded to the 
choice that the group made in the respective treatment. In line with standard procedures in 
experimental economics, subjects were presented with incentivized choices, i.e. paid cash 
for their participation in the experiment based on the choices they made. In addition, 
subjects received a show-up fee of 5,000 KRW to ensure they received adequate pay for 
participation.  




In this section, I will briefly present and discuss results from the experiments described 
above. All analyses were carried out using STATA SE 16.1. To give an overview of 
individual choices, I will first briefly discuss the choices from the first treatment 
(individual choice) before moving on to group choices as the main research focus of this 
study.  
Table 1 about here 
Table 1 shows the number of safe choices in the lottery for individuals. The average 
number of safe choices is 4.833. About 6.25% percent of subjects made inconsistent 
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choices, that is, they switched several times between the safe and the risky option. On 
average, subjects answered 32.29% of the intellective tasks correctly.  
In table 2, I compare the choices of five different types of groups: a voting group without 
a hierarchy, a group with a randomly determined hierarchy, a group with an elected 
leader, a group where the eldest group member became the leader, and a group where the 
group member who performed best on a financial literacy test became the leader. Please 
note that there are n = 160 observations in this data set, as all 32 groups made decisions 
under the aforementioned five different group settings (a voting group and four different 
types of hierarchy). 
Table 2 about here 
As Table 2 shows, groups with an age-based hierarchy make most safe choices (5.1563), 
followed by a voted leader (5.0938), those with a randomly determined leader and the 
voting group (5 each), and hierarchy by merit (4.9688). Voting groups and random and 
age-based hierarchies make fewer inconsistent choices in the lottery than those with an 
elected leader and hierarchy by merit. However, these differences are not statistically 
significant (Kruskal-Wallis test, χ2 = 0.322 for the number of safe choices, χ2 = 0.634 for 
the probability of an inconsistent choice). For the intellective tasks, groups with a merit-
based hierarchy make by far the most correct choices, while voting groups make by far 
the most incorrect choices. These differences are statistically significant (Kruskal-Wallis 
test, χ2 = 8.199).  
In Table 3, I present regression results for the same outcomes (number of safe choices in 
the lottery, probability of making an inconsistent choice, probability of a correct answer in 
the intellective task). Column 1 presents the determinants of the number of safe choices in 
the lottery task, using an ordered probit model. Column 2 presents the determinants of the 
probability of making an inconsistent choice in the lottery task, using a probit model. 
Column 3 presents the determinants of the probability of giving a correct answer in the 
intellective task, using a probit model. The baseline case is the voting group, and four 
dummy variables denote the aforementioned four different types of hierarchy. 
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To save space, only the regressors of interest are presented here. Full regression results 
including the constants for probit and cutpoints for ordered probit models can be found in 
Table 13 in Appendix A. ***, **, and * denote significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, 
respectively. 
Table 3 about here 
There seem to be no effects of different types of hierarchies on the number of safe choices 
and the probability of making an inconsistent choice in Holt and Laury (2002) type lottery 
choice tasks. However, compared to voting groups, groups with a leader assigned on the 
basis of merit are significantly more likely to provide a correct answer in the intellective 
tasks.  
In order to gauge the size of this effect, I also present changes in predicted probabilities 
for the probability of a making an inconsistent choice in the lottery task and giving a 
correct answer in the intellective task in Table 4. These were computed the SPost 14 
package (Long and Freese 2014). P-values are provided in parentheses. Again, to save 
space, changes in predicted probabilities using an ordered probit models are only 
presented in Appendix A, Table 15. 
Table 4 about here 
Compared to a voting group, having a leader assigned on the basis of merit increases the 
probability of giving a correct answer in the intellective task by 38.9%. This effect is 
found to be statistically significant at the 1% level. 
The groups’ choices might simply be a repetition of the leaders’ choices in the first 
individual choice task, both in the lottery and in the intellective tasks. To investigate this 
possibility, the following table compares the choices of leaders in the individual tasks to 
those they made as leaders of groups. This data set consists of the n =128 individuals who 
were leaders in one or more of the different hierarchy treatments. 
Table 5 about here 
In all treatments, the number of safe choices made by leaders increased, compared to the 
choices they made as individuals. The percentage of those who made inconsistent choices 
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decreased or was identical. However, only one of the differences is statistically significant 
(test statistics for paired sample t-tests are presented in Table 5): leaders by age make 
more safe choices when they become group leaders.  
For the intellective tasks, no statistically significant differences where found for leaders’ 
behaviour as individuals and as leaders. 
As there might be other determinants of leaders’ behavior, I also present results from a 
regression analysis of the determinants of leaders’ choices, which also allows to control 
for leaders’ characteristics. This data set consists of the n = 128 individuals who were 
leaders in one or more hierarchy treatments. While this analysis allows to control for 
leaders’ characteristics, it also allows to compare only choices in the hierarchy treatments, 
not choices in the voting group treatment. 
Table 6 presents results for the determinants of the three following outcomes: the number 
of safe choices (column 1), using an ordered probit model; the probability of making an 
inconsistent choice (column 2), using a probit model; and the probability of making a 
correct decision in the intellective task (column 3); using a probit model. In all three 
regressions, the following variables are included as regressors: a leader’s choices in the 
individual tasks (namely, their number of safe choices, if they made an inconsistent 
choice in the individual lottery choice task and their number of correct decisions in the 
individual intellective tasks), their gender (1 if female, 0 if male), the number of group 
members they had known before the experiment (if any), their citizenship (1 if Korean, 0 
if other), and the type of hierarchy under which they were the leader. The merit-based 
hierarchy is the baseline case and three dummy variables take the value of 1 if the person 
was a leader in an age-based, vote-based, or random mechanism-based hierarchy. To save 
space, only the regressors of interest are presented here. Full regression results including 
the constants and cutpoints can be found in Appendix A, Table 14. ***, **, and * denote 
significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
Table 6 about here 
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As these estimated coefficients are not very meaningful in non-linear models, I will only 
briefly discuss them before moving on to a more thorough discussion of marginal effects 
and changes in predicted probabilities for “ideal types”.  
For the determinants of the number of safe choices in the lottery task (column 1), a 
measure of risk aversion, no effect was found for any type of hierarchy, compared to the 
baseline case of hierarchy by merit. Two individual-level regressors are statistically 
significant: leaders who made more safe choices in the individual choice task (i.e. leaders 
who are more risk averse) tend to make more safe choices as the leader as well. Female 
leaders, interestingly, tend to make fewer safe choices than males.  
For the determinants of the probability of making an inconsistent choice in the lottery task 
(column 2), again, no effect was found for any type of hierarchy, compared to the baseline 
case of hierarchy by merit. Two individual-level regressors are statistically significant: the 
more group members a group knew before the experiment, the higher is their probability 
of making an inconsistent choice. In addition, Koreans are less likely to make an 
inconsistent choice, compared to non-Koreans.  
For the determinants of the probability of making an incorrect choice in the intellective 
task (column 3), a clear result emerges: compared to leaders who were appointed in 
hierarchy by merit, all others are significantly less likely to make a correct choice, even 
after controlling for the leader’s number of correct choices in the intellective tasks of the 
individual choice task and other individual characteristics. In addition, Koreans are 
significantly less likely to make a correct choice in the intellective task, compared to non-
Koreans. 
Table 7 presents average marginal effects (AMEs) for the same three regressions. These 
AMEs were calculated by computing changes for each observation at its observed values 
and then averaged, using the SPost13 package in Stata 16.1 (Long and Freese, 2014). P-
values are reported in parentheses. These average marginal effects were calculated for the 
change from hierarchy by merit to the respective other type of hierarchy (hierarchy by age, 
by vote, or a random hierarchy). Marginal effects for the probability of making an 
inconsistent choice and a correct answer, using a probit model and calculated using the 
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SPost package will be reported and discussed.   
As the interpretation of marginal effects in an ordered probit model with a dependent 
variable that can take values between 0 and 10 is rather space-consuming and probably 
not very informative for the research question, estimated coefficients from OLS 
regression for the number of safe choices were reported here. Marginal effects from an 
ordered probit model are presented in Appendix A, Table 16. 
Table 7 about here 
The results for determinants of the number of safe choices in the Holt and Laury (2002) 
lottery task (column 1) will be discussed first. None of the different types of hierarchy 
have a statistically significant effect on the number of safe choices. The only regressor 
that shows a statistically significant effect is the leader’s number of safe choices in the 
individual choice task, suggesting that individual risk attitude matters for a leader’s 
choices as well. For every additional safe choice that a group’s leader made in the 
individual choice task, the number of safe choices they make as leaders increases by 
0.6757. This estimated coefficient is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Regarding the determinants of the probability of making an inconsistent choice in the 
lottery task (column 2), there is an effect of having a leader based on age, as opposed to 
merit. Having a leader based on age decreases the probability of making an inconsistent 
choice by 5.3%, compared to having a leader based on merit. Also, Korean leaders have a 
lower probability of making an inconsistent choice, compared to non-Korean leaders, 
where the probability of making an inconsistent lottery choice as a leader decreases by 
6.7%, and this effect is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Finally, for the probability of making an incorrect choice in the intellective task (column 
3), the following results can be stated: compared to leaders who were appointed in a 
hierarchy by merit, all others are significantly less likely to make a correct choice, even 
after controlling for the leader’s number of correct choices in the intellective tasks in the 
individual choice task. More specifically, compared to leaders appointed by merit, leaders 
appointed by a random hierarchy are 16.4% less likely to make a correct choice, and this 
effect is statistically significant at the 5% level. Leaders appointed by vote are 18.6% less 
likely to make a correct choice, and this effect is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
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Lastly, leaders appointed by age are 21.9% less likely to make a correct choice in the 
intellective task, and this effect is statistically significant at the 1% level. In addition, 
Koreans are significantly less likely to make a correct choice in the intellective task, 
compared to non-Koreans: the probability that they make a correct choice is 26.3% lower, 
and this effect is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Lastly, in order to provide a more complete analysis of the possibly heterogeneous effects 
of type of hierarchy on group decision-making outcomes, I also present changes in 
predicted probabilities of the probability of making an inconsistent choice and giving a 
correct answer in the intellective tasks for four different “ideal types” of leaders: a non-
Korean woman, a non-Korean man, a Korean woman, and a Korean man. The changes in 
predicted probabilities here were calculated as the result of a change from the merit-based 
hierarchy to a vote-based, age-based, and random hierarchy. The other regressors were 
held constant at the sample means, with the exception of the number of safe choices in 
individual choice and the number of group members known before the experiment, which 
were held constant at the sample modes (Tables 8,9,10 and 11). 
To save space, again, the results from ordered probit models for the number of safe 
choices are only presented in Appendix A (Table 17). 
Tables 8 to 11 about here 
For the predicted probabilities of making an inconsistent choice in the lottery choice task, 
there are no statistically significant changes. For the predicted probabilities of making a 
correct answer in the intellective tasks, however, the predicted probabilities decrease for 
all types of hierarchy and all four “ideal types”, compared to a hierarchy by merit. 
Compared to a hierarchy by merit, the predicted probabilities decrease between 22.7% 
and 30.8% for a Korean woman, between 17.7% and 29.7% for a non-Korean woman, 
between 24.2% and 33.5% for a Korean man and between 15.2% and 26.3% for a non-
Korean man. The largest decrease in predicted probabilities is found for having a leader 
by age, compared to a leader by merit, and this effect is always found to be statistically 




5. Discussion and Conclusion 
This study presents experimental evidence on the choices of groups characterized by 
different types of hierarchies. The considered choice and decision tasks were a Holt and 
Laury-type lottery choice task (Holt and Laury, 2002), and intellective tasks, that is, 
applications of basic probability, framing, and Ellsberg paradox tasks. No evidence was 
found for an effect of types of hierarchy on the number of safe choices in the lottery 
choice task, but groups with a leader appointed by merit performed better on the 
intellective task choices than leaders appointed by a random mechanism, group vote, or 
age. Comparing these results to previous findings is difficult, as there is only little 
research on group behavior in experiments and none, to the best of my knowledge, that 
analyzes the role of hierarchies in group decision-making tasks such as the ones used in 
this study. When comparing the choices of individuals to those of voting groups, I found 
that voting groups (i.e. the type of group analyzed in previous research) make more safe 
choices than individuals, are less likely to make inconsistent choices, and are less likely to 
give correct answers in intellective tasks. This confirms the previous findings of 
Maciejovsky et al. (2013), who find that groups make choices closer to the rational 
prediction and learn the solution faster than individuals in challenging probability and 
reasoning tasks, Baker et al. (2008), who find that the number of safe lotteries chosen by 
groups is higher than the number of safe lotteries chosen by individual group members 
under unanimity voting, Masclet et al. (2009), who find that with the majority rule, groups 
choose safer lotteries, and Rockenbach et al. (2007), who find that groups accumulate 
more expected value at a lower risk than individuals. However, it contradicts the findings 
of Baillon et al. (2013), who find that groups make riskier choices than individuals in 
Allais paradox tasks (Allais 1953).  
Results on the determinants of the quality of group decision-making in psychology have 
typically also focused on group members’ individual characteristics, such as their 
expertise, or their openness to other opinions (Tindale and Winget 2019). The finding that 
groups with wiser members usually make better choices is confirmed by the finding that a 
merit-based leader makes better choices in intellective tasks. 
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With regard to the research hypotheses posited in this study, H1 (Groups where the leader 
has been assigned based on irrelevant characteristics (such as age or using a random 
assignment mechanism) perform worse on intellective tasks than those where the leader 
was assigned based on merit) was confirmed, but H2 (Groups with a hierarchy make more 
safe choices in a lottery choice task than those without hierarchy) was rejected. From a 
policy perspective, these results suggest that the still common practice of assigning 
leadership based on seniority might lead to decisions of suboptimal quality, while 
assigning leadership based on merit could improve the quality of decisions.  
In future research, it would be worthwhile to analyze the effect of hierarchies on other 
decision-making tasks, as well as the effect of other types of hierarchies on different types 
of outcomes. 
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Table 1. Number of safe choices, percentage of inconsistent choices for individuals 
    
  # of safe choices % of inc. choices % of correct IT answers n 
Entire sample 4.8333  6.25% 32.29% 96 
 
Table 2. Number of safe choices, percentage of inconsistent choices and correct 
number of answers to intellective task for groups  
  
  # of safe choices % of inc. choices % of correct IT answers n 
Voting group 5.0000  3.125% 16.125% 32 
Random hierarchy 5.0000  3.125% 28.125% 32 
Hierarchy by vote 5.0938 12.5% 21.875% 32 
Hierarchy by age 5.1563  3.125% 21.875% 32 
Hierarchy by merit 4.9688 6.25% 53.125% 32 
 
Table 3: Regression results - number of safe choices, probability of inconsistent 
choices and correct answers to intellective task for groups 
 # of safe 
choices 
(ordered probit) 
prob. of inc. 
choice 
(probit) 
prob. of correct 
IT answer 
(probit) 
1 = random hierarchy 0.0079 -0.0000 0.4309 
 (0.2549) (0.6180) (0.3568) 
1 = hierarchy by vote 0.0617 0.7124 0.2336 
 (0.2551) (0.5212) (0.3648) 
1 = age hierarchy 0.0713 -0.0000 0.2336 
 (0.2551) (0.6180) (0.3648) 
1 = merit hierarchy -0.0430 0.3286 1.0884*** 
 (0.2550) (0.5586) (0.3478) 
n 160 160 160 
 
The baseline group is the voting group without a hierarchy. Standard errors are given in 






Table 4: Changes in predicted probabilities, probability of inconsistent choices and 
correct answers to intellective task for groups  
  Prob. of inconsistent choice Prob. of correct IT answer 
1 = random hierarchy -0.000 0.148  (1.000) (0.251) 
1 = hierarchy by vote 0.126 0.077  (0.329) (0.541) 
1 = age hierarchy -0.000 0.077  (1.000) (0.541) 
1 = merit hierarchy 0.045   0.389*** 
  (0.633) (0.000) 
 
The baseline group is the voting group without a hierarchy. P-values are given in parentheses. 
***, **, and * denote significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
Table 5. Leader's choices in individual choice and as leaders 
  
No. of safe 
choices 
% of inc. 
choices 
% of correct IT 
answers n 
Individual choice 4.875 0.0938 0.2917 32 
Random hierarchy 5 0.0313 0.2813 32 
t -0.4865 1.0000 0.1203   
Individual choice 5.0000 0.0938 0.2292 32 
Hierarchy by vote 5.2188 0.1250 0.2500 32 
t -0.8515 -0.4416 -0.2260   
Individual choice 4.7500 0.0625 0.2604 32 
Hierarchy by age 5.1250 0.0313 0.2188 32 
 t -1.7510* 0.5712 0.4941   
Individual choice 4.7188 0.0938 0.3958 32 
Hierarchy by merit 4.8438 0.0938 0.5313 32 
t -0.4592 0.0000 -1.2687   









Table 6. Determinants of leaders’ choices: estimated coefficients 
 No. of safe 
choices 
(ordered probit) 
Prob. of inc. 
choice 
(probit) 
Prob. of correct 
IT answer 
(probit) 
1 = random leader 0.0607 -0.7767 -0.6459* 
 (0.2646) (0.7705) (0.3365) 
1 = elected leader 0.2159 -0.0428 -0.7622** 
 (0.2711) (0.5610) (0.3535) 
1 = leader by age 0.2067 -1.1516 -0.9695*** 
 (0.2655) (0.8655) (0.3565) 
No. of safe choices 0.5712*** 0.1189 -0.0786 
in ind. choice (0.0674) (0.1526) (0.0745) 
1 = inconsistent choice -0.5400 1.0948 0.1068 
in ind. choice (0.3708) (0.8372) (0.4996) 
Percentage of correct 0.2539 -0.5745 0.2063 
ind. IT choices (0.3371) (0.9299) (0.4474) 
1 = female -0.4773** -0.6540 -0.1642 
 (0.2125) (0.7813) (0.2801) 
No. of team members 0.0733 0.7028* -0.0506 
known before (0.1165) (0.3780) (0.1567) 
1 = Korean 0.2085 -2.2046*** -1.3389*** 
 (0.3219) (0.7617) (0.4192) 
n 128 128 128 
 
The baseline group is leaders by merit. Standard errors are given in parentheses. ***, **, 
and * denote significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. Full regression results 
including cutpoints for the ordered probit and constants for the probit model estimates can 












Table 7: Type of hierarchy and leaders’ choices – OLS estimates, marginal effects  
 No. of safe 
choices 
(OLS) 
Prob. of inc. 
choice 
(Probit) 
Prob. of correct 
IT answer 
(Probit) 
1 = random leader 0.0303 -0.042 -0.164** 
 (0.3197) (0.028) (0.065) 
1 = elected leader 0.1922 -0.003 -0.186*** 
 (0.3257) (0.041) (0.062) 
1 = leader by age 0.2318 -0.053** -0.219*** 
 (0.3210) (0.023) (0.052) 
# of safe choices 0.6757*** 0.010 -0.024 
in ind. choice (0.0662) (0.013) (0.022) 
1=inconsistent choice -0.6115 0.131 0.033 
in ind. choice (0.4492) (0.131) (0.159) 
Percentage of correct 0.2897 -0.034 0.065 
ind. IT choices (0.4091) (0.041) (0.147) 
1 = female -0.5442** -0.037 -0.048 
 (0.2541) (0.033) (0.078) 
No. of team members 0.0962 0.072 -0.015 
known before (0.1410) (0.047) (0.047) 
1 = Korean 0.2744 -0.067*** -0.263*** 
 (0.3892) (0.000) (0.042) 
Constant 1.5058**   
 (0.6304)   
N 128 128 128 
 
The baseline group is leaders by merit. Standard errors are given in parentheses. ***, **, 
and * denote significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. Full regression results 
including cutpoints for the ordered probit and constants for the probit model estimates can 
be found in the appendix.  
Table 8: Changes in predicted probabilities, Korean woman 
 Prob. of inconsistent choice Prob. of correct IT answer 

















Table 9: Changes in predicted probabilities, non-Korean woman 
 Prob. of inc. choice Prob. of correct IT answer 













Table 10: Changes in predicted probabilities, Korean man 
 Prob. of inc. choice Prob. of correct IT answer 













Table 11: Changes in predicted probabilities, non-Korean man 
 Prob. of inc. choice Prob. of correct IT answer 













The baseline group is leaders by merit. P-values are given in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote 
significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The changes in predicted probabilities are 
for a binary change to the respective type of hierarchy (random, elected, or by age).  
All estimates contain the following control variables: an individual’s number of safe choices (held 
constant at the sample mode), the probability that an individual made an inconsistent choice (held 
at the sample mean), their percentage of correct IT answers in individual choice (held at the 
sample mean), and the number of team members they knew before the experiment (held at the 








Appendix A: Additional statistics and results 
Table 12: Sample demographics 
  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
No. of safe choices in ind. choice  4.8333 1.7147 1 10 
1 = inconsistent choice in ind. choice 0.0625 0.2433 0 1 
% of correct ind.  IT choices 0.3229 0.2534 0 1 
Female 0.3854 0.4892 0 1 
No. of members known before 0.9583 0.8325 0 2 


























Table 13: Regression results - number of safe choices, percentage of inconsistent 
choices and correct number of answers to intellective task for groups, full estimation 
results 
 # of safe choices prob. of inc. 
choice 
prob. of correct 
IT answer 
1 = random hierarchy 0.0079 -0.0000 0.4309 
 (0.2549) (0.6180) (0.3568) 
1 = hierarchy by vote 0.0617 0.7124 0.2336 
 (0.2551) (0.5212) (0.3648) 
1 = age hierarchy 0.0713 -0.0000 0.2336 
 (0.2551) (0.6180) (0.3648) 
1 = merit hierarchy -0.0430 0.3286 1.0884 
 (0.2550) (0.5586) (0.3478)*** 
cut1 (constant) -1.9417 -1.8627 -1.0100 
 (0.2651)*** (0.4370)*** (0.2679)*** 
cut2 -1.6272   
 (0.2323)***   
cut3 -0.9407   
 (0.2001)***   
cut4 -0.2664   
 (0.1897)   
cut5 0.3057   
 (0.1896)   
cut6 1.0842   
 (0.2029)***   
cut7 1.4175   
 (0.2172)***   
cut8 1.8014   
 (0.2464)***   
cut9 1.9809   
 (0.2675)***   
n 160 160 160 
 
Standard errors are given in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance levels of 1%, 









Table 14: Ordered probit estimates, number of safe choices, full estimation results 
 Number of safe choices 
1 = random leader 0.0607 
 (0.2646) 
1 = elected leader 0.2159 
 (0.2711) 
1 = leader by age 0.2067 
 (0.2655) 
No. of safe in ind. choice 0.5712 
 (0.0674)*** 
1 = inc. choice in ind. choice -0.5400 
 (0.3708) 
% of correct ind.  IT choices 0.2539 
 (0.3371) 


























Standard errors are given in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance levels of 1%, 





Table 15: Groups, predicted probabilities, number of safe choices 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 = random 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 
 (0.975) (0.975) (0.975) (0.975) (0.989) (0.975) (0.975) (0.975) (0.976) (0.976) 
1 = vote -0.003 -0.003 -0.009 -0.008 0.000 0.009 0.005 0.004 0.001 0.004 
 (0.798) (0.803) (0.806) (0.814) (0.909) (0.803) (0.811) (0.814) (0.818) (0.821) 
1 = age -0.004 -0.003 -0.010 -0.010 -0.001 0.011 0.005 0.005 0.002 0.004 
 (0.766) (0.772) (0.776) (0.786) (0.896) (0.772) (0.783) (0.787) (0.792) (0.795) 
1 = merit 0.003 0.002 0.006 0.006 0.000 -0.007 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 
  (0.872) (0.870) (0.867) (0.863) (0.937) (0.868) (0.865) (0.863) (0.863) (0.861) 
Average 



















Table 16: Ordered probit estimates, number of safe choices, marginal effects 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 = random -0.003 -0.002 -0.006 -0.006 0 0.007 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 
(+1) (0.011) (0.008) (0.027) (0.024) (0.003) (0.03) (0.013) (0.015) (0.007) (0.007) 
1 = elected -0.008 -0.006 -0.021 -0.02 -0.003 0.023 0.011 0.013 0.006 0.006 
(+1) (0.009) (0.008) (0.026) (0.027) (0.008) (0.027) (0.014) (0.018) (0.01) (0.01) 
1 = age -0.008 -0.006 -0.021 -0.02 -0.003 0.022 0.01 0.012 0.006 0.006 
(+1) (0.009) (0.008) (0.026) (0.027) (0.007) (0.027) (0.014) (0.018) (0.009) (0.009) 
No. of safe 
in ind. 
choice -0.017** -0.015* -0.052*** -0.057*** -0.019** 0.051*** 0.029*** 0.038*** 0.02 0.021** 
(+1) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.01) (0.008) (0.012) (0.01) (0.014) (0.013) (0.011) 
1 = inc. 
choice in 
ind. choice 0.023 0.018 0.056 0.048 0.002 -0.063 -0.026 -0.03 -0.014 -0.014 
(marginal) (0.019) (0.015) (0.04) (0.034) (0.007) (0.044) (0.019) (0.023) (0.013) (0.012) 
% of 
correct ind.  
IT choices -0.011 -0.008 -0.026 -0.023 -0.001 0.03 0.012 0.014 0.006 0.006 
(marginal) (0.015) (0.012) (0.036) (0.031) (0.003) (0.04) (0.016) (0.019) (0.009) (0.009) 
1 = female 0.028 0.018 0.051** 0.034*** -0.01 -0.062** -0.02** -0.021 -0.009 -0.009* 
(+1) (0.02) (0.013) (0.024) (0.012) (0.011) (0.029) (0.01) (0.011) (0.006) (0.005) 
knewbefore -0.003 -0.002 -0.007 -0.007 -0.001 0.008 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.002 
(+1) (0.005) (0.004) (0.012) (0.011) (0.002) (0.013) (0.006) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003) 
1 = korean -0.008 -0.006 -0.021 -0.02 -0.003 0.023 0.01 0.013 0.006 0.006 
(+1) (0.011) (0.009) (0.031) (0.032) (0.009) (0.032) (0.017) (0.021) (0.011) (0.011) 
Average 
predictions 0.026 0.027 0.121 0.211 0.22 0.252 0.053 0.049 0.021 0.021 
 
Standard errors are given in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance levels of 1%, 











Table 17: Predicted probabilities from ordered probit models, no of safe choices 
Korean woman           
No of safe choices 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Random = 0 0.008 0.017 0.137 0.314 0.292 0.201 0.019 0.009 0.001 0 
Random = 1 0.007 0.015 0.125 0.305 0.298 0.216 0.022 0.011 0.002 0 
           
No of safe choices 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Vote = 0 0.008 0.017 0.137 0.314 0.292 0.201 0.019 0.009 0.001 0 
Vote = 1 0.004 0.011 0.1 0.277 0.306 0.254 0.029 0.016 0.003 0.001 
           
No of safe choices 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Age = 0 0.008 0.017 0.137 0.314 0.292 0.201 0.019 0.009 0.001 0 
Age= 1 0.004 0.011 0.101 0.279 0.306 0.252 0.029 0.016 0.003 0.001 
           
           Non-Korean woman          
No of safe choices 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Random = 0 0.014 0.026 0.178 0.341 0.268 0.155 0.012 0.005 0.001 0 
Random = 1 0.012 0.023 0.165 0.334 0.276 0.168 0.014 0.006 0.001 0 
           
No of safe choices 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Vote = 0 0.014 0.026 0.178 0.341 0.268 0.155 0.012 0.005 0.001 0 
Vote = 1 0.008 0.017 0.135 0.313 0.293 0.203 0.019 0.01 0.002 0 
           
No of safe choices 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Age = 0 0.014 0.026 0.178 0.341 0.268 0.155 0.012 0.005 0.001 0 
Age= 1 0.008 0.017 0.137 0.315 0.292 0.201 0.019 0.009 0.001 0 
           Korean man           
No of safe choices 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Random = 0 0.002 0.006 0.064 0.224 0.306 0.318 0.045 0.028 0.006 0.001 
Random = 1 0.002 0.005 0.057 0.211 0.303 0.332 0.05 0.032 0.007 0.002 
           
No of safe choices 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Vote = 0 0.002 0.006 0.064 0.224 0.306 0.318 0.045 0.028 0.006 0.001 
Vote = 1 0.001 0.003 0.042 0.179 0.291 0.366 0.062 0.043 0.01 0.003 
           
No of safe choices 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Age = 0 0.002 0.006 0.064 0.224 0.306 0.318 0.045 0.028 0.006 0.001 
Age= 1 0.001 0.003 0.043 0.181 0.291 0.364 0.062 0.042 0.01 0.002 






No of safe choices 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Random = 0 0.004 0.009 0.091 0.267 0.308 0.267 0.032 0.018 0.003 0.001 
Random = 1 0.003 0.008 0.083 0.255 0.309 0.282 0.036 0.021 0.004 0.001 
           
No of safe choices 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Vote = 0 0.004 0.009 0.091 0.267 0.308 0.267 0.032 0.018 0.003 0.001 
Vote = 1 0.002 0.005 0.063 0.222 0.305 0.32 0.046 0.029 0.006 0.001 
           
No of safe choices 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Age = 0 0.004 0.009 0.091 0.267 0.308 0.267 0.032 0.018 0.003 0.001 
Age= 1 0.002 0.006 0.064 0.224 0.306 0.318 0.045 0.028 0.006 0.001 
 
These tables present changes in predicted probabilities for a random hierarchy, a vote-
based hierarchy and an age-based hierarchy, compared to a hierarchy by merit. All 
estimates include controls for the number of safe choices a leader made in the individual 
choice task, if they made an inconsistent choice in the individual choice task, and the 
percentage of intellective tasks they answered correctly in the individual task. The 
controls were held fixed at their sample means, except for the number of safe choices in 
individual choice and the number of group members that they knew before the 















Appendix B: Experimental instructions and decision sheets 
Instructions 
You will now participate in an experiment on decision-making. First, you will make 
decisions alone and then you will make the same decisions as groups in five different 
settings. After each group decision-making session and after finishing the last group 
decision-making session, you will answer a short questionnaire about the experiment. 
Finally, at the end of the experiment, you will be paid. 
Your decision sheet shows ten Decisions listed. Each decision is a choice between 
"Option A" and "Option B." You will make ten choices and record these in the final 
column. However, only one of them will be used in the end to determine your earnings. 
Before you start making your ten choices, please let me explain how the choices you 
made will determine your earnings for this part of the experiment. 
Here is a ten-sided die that will be used to determine payoffs; the faces are numbered 
from 1 to 10 (the "0" face of the die will serve as 10). 
After you have made all of your choices, we will throw this die twice. With the first throw 
of the die, we will select one of the ten decisions to be used. With the second throw of the 
die, we will determine what your payoff is for the Option you chose, A or B, for the 
particular decision selected.  
Even though you will make ten decisions, only one of these will end up affecting your 
earnings, but you will not know in advance which decision will be used.  
Obviously, each decision has an equal chance of being used to determine your payment in 
the end. 
Now, please look at decision 1 at the top of your decision sheet. Option A pays 2000 Won 
if we roll 1, and it pays 1600 Won if we roll 2-10. Option B pays 3850 Won if we roll 1, 
and it pays 100 Won if we roll 2-10. The other decisions are similar, except that as you 
move down the table, the chances of the higher payoff for each option increase. In fact, 
for decision 10 in the bottom row, the die will not be needed since each option pays the 
highest payoff for sure, so your choice here is between 2000 Won or 3850 Won. 
To summarize, you will make ten choices: for each decision you will have to choose 
between Option A and Option B. You may choose A for some decisions and B for others, 
and you may change your choices and make them in any order. At the end of the 
experiment, you will come to our desk and we will throw the ten-sided die to select which 
of the ten decisions will be used. Then we will throw the die again to determine your 
money earnings for the option you chose for that decision. Earnings (in Won) for this 
choice will be added to your show-up fee, and you will be paid all earnings via bank 
transfer. 
So now please look at the empty boxes on the right side of the record sheet. You will have 
to choose between A or B in each of these boxes, and at the end of the experiment, a die 
throw will determine which one is going to count for your payment. We will look at the 
Decision that you made for the choice that counts, and circle it, before throwing the die 
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again to determine your earnings for this choice. Then you will write your earnings in the 
blank at the bottom of the page.  
On the second page of the record sheet, there are three short questions. Please also answer 
those questions. 
Are there any questions? Now you may begin making your choices. Please don’t talk with 





 Option A Option B Your choice 
Decision 1 2000 W [1] 
1600 W [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 ,8, 9, 10] 
3850 W [1] 
100 W [2, 3, 4,5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10] 
Option A       □ 
Option B       □ 
Decision 2 2000 W [1, 2] 
1600 W [3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10] 
3850 W [1, 2] 
100 W [3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10] 
Option A       □ 
Option B       □ 
Decision 3 2000 W [1, 2, 3] 
1600 W [4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10] 
3850 W [1, 2, 3] 
100 W [4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10] 
Option A       □ 
Option B       □ 
Decision 4 2000 W [1, 2, 3, 4] 
1600 W [5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10] 
3850 W [1, 2, 3, 4] 
100 W [5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10] 
Option A       □ 
Option B       □ 
Decision 5 2000 W [1, 2, 3, 4, 5] 
1600 W [6, 7, 8, 9, 10] 
3850 W [1, 2, 3, 4, 5] 
100 W [6, 7, 8, 9, 10] 
Option A       □ 
Option B       □ 
Decision 6 2000 W [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6] 
1600 W [7, 8, 9, 10] 
3850 W [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6] 
100 W [7, 8, 9, 10] 
Option A       □ 
Option B       □ 
Decision 7 2000 W [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7] 
1600 W [8, 9, 10] 
3850 W [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7] 
100 W [8, 9, 10] 
Option A       □ 
Option B       □ 
Decision 8 2000 W [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8] 
1600 W [9, 10] 
3850 W [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8] 
100 W [9, 10] 
Option A       □ 
Option B       □ 
Decision 9 2000 W [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9] 
1600 W [10] 
3850 W [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9] 
100 W [10] 
Option A       □ 
Option B       □ 
Decision 
10 
2000 W [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 
10] 
1600 W [-] 
3850 W [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 
10] 
100 W [-] 
Option A       □ 









Examples of intellective tasks: 
Imagine that your country is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual new disease,  
which is expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to combat the disease have 
been proposed: Program A and Program B.  
If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved.  
If Program B is adopted, there is a 1/3 probability that 600 people will be saved, and  
a 2/3 probability that no people will be saved. 
Assuming that these are the exact scientific estimates of the consequences of the  
programs, which one will you choose as the most effective?  
(a) Program A        □ 
(b) Program B        □ 
(c) Both programs are equally effective     □ 
(d) I cannot decide       □ 
 
You have the chance of buying a lottery ticket. Suppose that on the first ticket the  
numbers are 7, 12, 18, 24, 33 and 45 and on the second ticket, the numbers listed  
are 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6.  
Which one do you think has the higher chance of being winner? 
(a) The first ticket       □ 
(b) The second ticket       □ 
(c) Both tickets have equal chances of being a winner  □ 
(d) I cannot decide       □ 
 
Suppose you have an urn with 90 balls, 30 yellow and 60 red or blue. You don't know 
how many red or how many blue balls there are, but that the total number of red  
balls plus the total number of blue equals 60. The balls are well mixed so that each  
individual ball is as likely to be drawn as any other. You can draw one ball from the  
urn and you have to bet on the color of the ball. If you correctly guess the color of  
the ball, you can earn $100. Which color do you think has the highest probability of  
being drawn? 
(a) Yellow        □ 
(b) Red        □ 
(c) Both have equal probability of being drawn   □ 
(d) I cannot decide       □ 
 
Instructions 2 (no hierarchy - voting group) 
In this round, you will make choices as a group about the same decisions as before. You 
will have 10 minutes to discuss your decisions before you will have to make choices 
about the options. 
The decision-making rule in this round is as follows: you will vote as a group about your 
choice in each decision, and the option that gets most votes will be adopted.  
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The payment that is relevant for your earnings will be decided the same way as before: At 
the end of the experiment, you will come to our desk and we will throw the ten-sided die 
to select which of the ten decisions will be used. Then we will throw the die again to 
determine your money earnings for the option you chose for that decision. Earnings (in 
Won) for this choice will be added to your show-up fee and your previous earnings, and 
you will be paid all earnings via bank transfer for the Korean students.  
Please also answer the question on the second page of the decision sheet. 
Each group member will get the same payment. 
Instructions 3 (hierarchy - random leader) 
In this round, you will again make choices as a group about the same Decisions as before.  
However, the rule to decide about your choices will be changed.  
Instead of voting about your choices, a group leader will be chosen and make choices on 
behalf of the entire group. The group leader will be chosen randomly by throwing a die.  
Before making a decision, there will be a ten-minute discussion time with all group 
members. Your payment will be determined based on the group leader’s decision, and 
each group member will get the same payment.  
The payment that is relevant for your earnings will be decided the same way as before: At 
the end of the experiment, you will come to our desk and we will throw the ten-sided die 
to select which of the ten Decisions will be used. Then we will throw the die again to 
determine your money earnings for the Option you chose for that Decision. Earnings (in 
Won) for this choice will be added to your show-up fee and your previous earnings, and 
you will be paid all earnings via bank transfer.  
Please also answer the question on the second page of the decision sheet. 
Again, each group member will get the same payment. 
Instructions 4 (hierarchy - elected leader) 
In this round, you will again make choices as a group about the same Decisions as before. 
However, the rule to decide about your choices will be changed. 
Instead of voting about your choices, a group leader will be chosen by all group members 
and make choices on behalf of the entire group.  
Before making a decision, there will be a ten-minute discussion time with all group 
members. Your payment will be determined based on the group leader’s decision, and 
every group member will get the same payment.  
The payment that is relevant for your earnings will be decided the same way as before: At 
the end of the experiment, you will come to our desk and we will throw the ten-sided die 
to select which of the ten Decisions will be used. Then we will throw the die again to 
determine your money earnings for the Option you chose for that Decision. Earnings (in 
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Won) for this choice will be added to your show-up fee and your previous earnings, and 
you will be paid all earnings via bank transfer.  
Please also answer the question on the second page of the decision sheet. 
Again, each group member will get the same payment. 
Instructions 5 (hierarchy – leader by age) 
In this round, you will again make choices as a group about the same Decisions as before. 
However, the rule to decide about your choices will be changed. 
Instead of voting about your choices, a group leader will be chosen and make choices on 
behalf of the entire group. The group leader will be the oldest person in your group. 
Before making a decision, there will be a ten-minute discussion time with all group 
members. Your payment will be determined based on the group leader’s decision, and 
every group member will get the same payment.  
The payment that is relevant for your earnings will be decided the same way as before: At 
the end of the experiment, you will come to our desk and we will throw the ten-sided die 
to select which of the ten Decisions will be used. Then we will throw the die again to 
determine your money earnings for the Option you chose for that Decision. Earnings (in 
Won) for this choice will be added to your show-up fee and your previous earnings, and 
you will be paid all earnings via bank transfer. 
Please also answer the question on the second page of the decision sheet. 
Again, each group member will get the same payment. 
Instructions 6 (hierarchy – leader by merit) 
In this round, you will again make choices as a group about the same Decisions as before. 
However, the rule to decide about your choices will be changed. 
Instead of voting about your choices, a group leader will be chosen and make choices on 
behalf of the entire group. The group leader will be the person in your group who 
performs best on the short test that you can find at the back of these instructions. 
Before making a decision, there will be a ten-minute discussion time with all group 
members. Your payment will be determined based on the group leader’s decision, and 
every group member will get the same payment.  
The payment that is relevant for your earnings will be decided the same way as before: At 
the end of the experiment, you will come to our desk and we will throw the ten-sided die 
to select which of the ten Decisions will be used. Then we will throw the die again to 
determine your money earnings for the Option you chose for that Decision. Earnings (in 
Won) for this choice will be added to your show-up fee and your previous earnings, and 
you will be paid all earnings via bank transfer. 
Please also answer the question on the second page of the decision sheet. 
36 
 
Again, each group member will get the same payment. 
Financial literacy test questions (used to appoint leaders by merit) 
Suppose you have $100 in a savings account earning 2 percent interest a year. After five 
years, how much would you have? 
Exactly $102   □ 
Less than $102  □ 
More than $102  □ 
Don’t know   □ 
Imagine that the interest rate on your savings account is 1 percent a year and inflation is 2 
percent a year. After one year, would the money in the account buy more than it does 
today, exactly the same or less than today? 
Less    □ 
Same    □ 
More    □ 
Don’t know   □ 
If interest rates rise, what will typically happen to bond prices? Rise, fall, stay the same, 
or is there no relationship? 
Rise    □ 
Fall     □ 
Stay the same   □ 
No relationship  □ 
True or false: A 15-year mortgage typically requires higher monthly payments than a 30-
year mortgage but the total interest over the life of the loan will be less. 
True    □ 
False    □ 
Don’t know   □ 
True or false: Buying a single company's stock usually provides a safer return than a stock 
mutual fund. 
True    □ 
False    □ 
Don’t know   □ 
 
 
 
 
 
